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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: William J. Donovan

I am attaching, as of possible interest  
the translated text of a message sent by Laval  
to the French Ambassador here on July 7, 1942

*Report sent*

June 2, 1942

Brigadier General William B. Smith  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

I thought you might like to show to General  
Marshall the attached, which is a copy of a mes-  
sage received in Vichy from the French Ambassador  
here commenting upon General Marshall's speech at  
West Point.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

June 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

From: William J. Donovan

The following cables, sent by the French  
Ambassador to Vichy on Wednesday June 24, may be  
of interest to you.

**MOST SECRET**

August 14, 1942

The following information has reached us from a reliable and extremely delicate source:

During the latter part of July, Japanese missions in Europe were informed that Japan is unable to co-ordinate her operations in the Far East with those of the Axis in Europe, and the sole method of co-operation, therefore, is exchange of information.

At the present time, Japan cannot commence war against Russia; but should the latter collapse, Japan will occupy the maritime provinces and northern part of Sakhalin.

Japan anticipates that the struggle against Britain and the U.S.A. will be very long; therefore, Japanese-occupied territories must be organized for the future war effort. The most serious obstacle to a continued offensive lies in the shortage of tonnage.

# MOST SECRET

August 14, 1942

From a reliable and very delicate source, we are informed that recently two Japanese divisions were sent from Indo China to the Guinan or adjacent islands.

The identification and dates of departure are unknown, but one division is reported to have moved via Kai Chiao Pu Saigon, and the other via Hiphong and Hainan Island.

This report is given with great reserve and is for information only, to contradict a Reuters report of August 7th which tells of the recent arrival in Indo China of 2 Japanese divisions. It should be noted, however, that the Reuters message originates from Chungking, giving a total of four divisions (approximately 100,000 Japanese soldiers) in Indo China, and referring to an impending attack on Hanking. This strongly suggests Chinese Intelligence propaganda.

**MOST SECRET**

August 14, 1942

From a reliable and extremely delicate source, we are informed that Japanese Ambassador in Europe have recently received instructions from Tokyo to pay great attention to the possibility that Russia might agree to a compromise peace with Germany.

Japan is not in favor of such a peace, since she fears that eventually it could lead to a compromise peace between the democracies and Germany, leaving Japan standing alone. She fears that there are sympathetic elements in the U.S.A. favoring and working for peace with Nazi Germany, with the idea of rendering aid to Germany in consolidating the eastern territories, and thus making the full strength of the U.S.A. available against Japan. This would be the culmination of Japan's constant fear of the ultimate amalgamation of the white races against her.

Meanwhile, her policy to Russia is "wait and see".

August 18, 1942

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**FROM:** The Director of Strategic Services

From a reliable and extremely delicate source we have received the following information:

1) Japanese Embassies in Europe have recently received instructions from Tokio to pay great attention to the possibility that Russia might agree to a compromise peace with Germany.

Japan is not in favor of such a peace, since she fears that eventually it could lead to a compromise peace between the democracies and Germany, leaving Japan standing alone. She fears that there are capitalistic elements in the U.S.A. favoring and working for peace with Nazi Germany, with the idea of rendering aid to Germany in capitalizing the eastern territories, and thus making the full strength of the U.S.A. available against Japan. This would be the culmination of Japan's constant fear of the ultimate annihilation of the white races against her.

Meanwhile, her policy to Russia is "wait and see".

2) Recently two Japanese divisions were sent from Indo China to New Guinea or adjacent islands.

The identification and dates of departure are unknown, but one division is reported to have moved via Wai Chiao Pu Island, and the other via Haiphong, and Hainan Island.



*Ben Hand 2211*

August 18, 1942

Brigadier General W. B. Smith  
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Smith:

I am attaching a memorandum containing  
certain bits of information which came to me  
yesterday.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director



11354

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Washington, D. C.

There is attached hereto a translation of a  
report, dated August 8, 1942, written by a woman of  
German birth but of Swiss nationality through marriage,  
giving her views on the situation in Germany.

Enclosure

*See 10-12-42  
for 10/14/42*

October 7, 1942

File

Copy to: Donovan, Bruce, G-2, ONI, RMA, Rogers,  
Jasperdon, Souverie, Huntington.

SECRET

October 14, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane  
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Deane:

✓ Here is a translation of a  
report dated August 8, 1942, written by  
a woman of German birth but of Swiss  
nationality through marriage.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

November 4, 1942

Brigadier General John F. Deane  
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Deane:

For your information, the attached  
cable was received this morning from our re-  
presentative in Vichy.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

~~32~~ Vichy

SECRET

November 20, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane,  
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,  
Public Health Building,  
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

I think you might want to read the following cable  
from our man in Tangiers:

"There are strongest indications that the  
Germans are setting up in Tangier the principal  
espionage center for North Africa. Spanish  
agents will also be used by them. It is con-  
sidered imperative that General Patton post  
alert guards on the road to Melilla from  
Merkane and at Arbousa to pick up Axis  
people. Last week 120, including Gebhardt  
and Auer, came over the former road. Sabotage  
plans on our Moroccan forces, I suspect, will  
be directed from here. The bridges reported  
in my #13 are two bridges 5 kilometers north-  
west of Alcazar and the other just south of  
Alcazar. On the night of the seventeenth  
15,000 men left for the frontier, according  
to a report from a reliable source. At  
7 a.m. today (Nov. 18) the last convoy includ-  
ing tanks and guns reached the International  
Bridge. On the 17th, the general of Carthage  
area and his staff arrived at Larache."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

November 24, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Deane:

The following message came from Colonel Eday this morning, who requested that it be passed on to the Chief of Naval Operations. This I have done. I thought it should also go to you.

"From Algiers by automobile I found no United States troops in Taza Pass, Fez, Petitjean or Tiemcen. Solitary Moorish soldiers guard the bridges. While the Spanish threat is lessening these points are vulnerable. All Moroccan sources report the insouciance of SOLANDPPF (sic) who assure the Moors and French that the politics will remain the same, the Americans will leave and the Germans will return. The civilians are friendly in spite of this propaganda and hope that the rascals will be turned out. The U.S. has no patrol at the Spanish and French Moroccan border to intercept the undesirables. Free passage of Axis agents across this border is dangerous!"

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Notes: SOLANDPPF, Service d'Ordre de la Legion (Secret Police of Pétain's Legion) Parti Populaire Français (Doriot Party)

SECRET

November 26, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane,  
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,  
Public Health Building,  
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

I thought you would be interested in the following  
message which we received today from one of our  
representatives in Tangiers:

"A very important native contact of ours  
has been approached by Spanish monarchists.  
They stated that there would be a monarchist  
coup in the near future. Most of the Spanish  
leaders, with the exception of Franco, are  
in on the plan. They gave our contact a  
letter which is now in our possession. We  
are prepared to give credence because of  
the openness and lack of fear in using  
names."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

"After examining the note of the American Government, dated April 13th, which was handed to you by Mr. Sumner Welles, please notify the State Department that the French Government cannot accept the terms of this note which it rejects as a whole.

"This document, indeed, is worded in insulting terms and its purpose is to try to discredit before the eyes of the world the French citizens who do not need any lessons in patriotism from foreigners.

"Moreover, the French Government is obliged to note that the unprecedented and immediate publication of this strange document shows that it was conceived for propaganda purposes and with a view to stirring up French public opinion."

April 15, 1942

General William B. Smith  
Combined Chiefs of Staff  
222 Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

Colonel Donovan has asked me to  
send you the attached, which is the  
text of a message sent from Vichy to  
the French Ambassador here yesterday.

Sincerely,

J. R. Murphy

Attachment



May 12, 1942

General William B. Smith,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

Colonel Donovan has asked me to return the  
enclosed to you and to thank you for letting him see  
it. He also stated that he would like to discuss it  
with you soon.

Sincerely,

James R. Murphy

V  
Very Accurate  
Lot 20. -

- 4 -

they accept readily the position taken by the Soviets of neutrality in regard to Japan, and furthermore their needs in merchant vessels are such that they are not willing to part with any of them, under any pretext, for the benefit of other theaters of operation.

"H. Baldwin, military critic of the New York Times, wrote that it was quite possible that Japan might soon propose a negotiated peace with the United States."

- 3 -

"For his part, M. Cordell Hull said at his press conference that the position of the United States government has not changed and that he had had occasion to express that position so often that it was becoming tiresome to have to repeat it, the position being as follows: that the Gaullists are considered combatants who by that name receive lend-lease aid, but that there is no question at all of giving them any political recognition whatever. The French government, M. Hull concluded, after the war will be the one chosen by the general wish of French citizens."

Henry Hays sent the following telegram to Vichy:

"The Japanese Prime Minister declared to the Tokyo Diet that relations between Russia and Japan continued to be on a basis of the strictest neutrality.

"I know from a reliable source that Russia has requested the United States that American merchant vessels, loaded with war provisions, be sent to Vladivostok, with the understanding, the Russians said, that they had the tacit agreement with the Japanese that these ships could circulate freely and without restriction.

"The United States refused. As a matter of fact they do not at all wish to give the impression that

- 2 -

the controversies arisen as to the political statute of General de Gaulle.

"General de Gaulle, in fact, declared at a press conference held in London that it was essential that his movement be considered a combatant movement above all, but also as a political movement. Otherwise, he added, the French people would merely be gun-fodder, either in battle or in mass executions, and would have no representation in the war and peace councils.

"Speaking of M. Camille Chautemps, de Gaulle declared that there were limits to pleasantries and that it was impossible to concede that the former president of the Council and a signer of the Armistice could join a movement clearly designed to perpetuate the resistance.

"I must point out in this regard that M. Chautemps' intrigues, supported by American statesmen, should amuse the newspapers and that FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE, a weekly inspired by British propaganda, should particularly print today that it is indispensable that the de Gaulle movement should be directed politically by men who are experienced and trained in parliamentary practice, which evidently alludes to M. Chautemps.

**Secret**

Thursday, May 28, 1942

- 1 -

Admiral Robert sent the following telegram to  
Henry-Haye:

"For the Naval Attache.

"The American destroyer BLAKELY entered the road-  
stead at Port de France day before yesterday after  
having been torpedoed by an enemy submarine.

"After a stay of twenty-four hours the BLAKELY  
put out to sea, having made some repairs through  
good fortune and having landed their wounded; it was  
headed towards Saint Lucia. The damages seem to be  
very slight."

The following telegram was sent to Vichy by  
Henry-Haye:

"The American government has proposed to the  
U.S.S.R. the conclusion of a new agreement concerning  
a lend-lease loan. The purpose would be to link  
Russia with the principles of economic liberty after  
the war and it must be considered as being part of an  
entire concerted organization pertaining to the post-  
war period."

Henry-Haye sent the following telegram to Vichy:

"The newspapers on the one hand and M. Cordel  
Bill on the other hand have given great publicity to

-3-

Times, wrote that it was quite possible that Japan might soon propose a negotiated peace with the United States."

-2-

"The Japanese Prime Minister declared to the Tokyo . . . let that relations between Russia and Japan continued to be on a basis of the strictest neutrality.

"I know from a reliable source that Russia has requested the United States that American merchant vessels, loaded with war provisions, be sent to Vladivostok, with the understanding, the Russians said, that they had the tacit agreement with the Japanese that these ships could circulate freely and without molestation.

"The United States refused. As a matter of fact they do not at all wish to give the impression that they accept readily the position taken by the Soviets of neutrality in regard to Japan, and farth more their needs in merchant vessels are such that they are not willing to part with any of these, under any pretext, for the benefit of other theaters of operation.

"Baldwin, military critic of the New York

May 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: William J. Donovan

From a Vichy source that we have established we have obtained the following cables:

1. Admiral Robert sent the following telegram to Henry-Haps:

"For the Naval Attache.

"The American destroyer BLAKELY entered the roadstead at Fort de France day before yesterday after having been torpedoed by an enemy submarine.

"After a stay of twenty-four hours the BLAKELY put out to sea, having made some repairs through good fortune and having landed their wounded; it was headed towards Saint Lucia. The damages seem to be very slight."

2. Henry-Haps sent the following telegram to

Vichy:



- 3 -

to open a second front, that in that case the American army would be ready to dispatch contingents for the purpose of providing relief of the territory of Great Britain, but that in no case would the American general staff agree to open the battle of the continent first.

"In regard to the air forces, there is the same situation. There are at present fifty-four combat groups, formed and instructed. Now it is announced that the air force is going to consist of 84 groups, which shows well that the existing units will still remain on American territory. In fact, it will only be when the Air Corps expansion program is obstructed by the number of existing groups already instructed, that the United States is going to be able to "export" combat squadrons. Until then it is completely occupied with extension and growth, without any serious possibility of going into competition with enemy air forces which have already proved themselves on bloody fields of battle.

"In resume, the military situation of the United States, when stripped of the lyricism of the journalists and public commentators and of the optimism expressed by official personages, is quite clearly unfavorable. It allows no important strategic movement, no great tactical strategy, and even less the opening of a second front in Europe or Asia."

- 2 -

were not at all depressed and continued the cycle of their operations imperturbably:

"3. Putting into operation the armed forces and the air forces. Here there are two periods:

a/ The army tried to form new units by gradually taking from the existing units officers and non-commissioned officers to instruct the new recruits. The result was deplorable for at the same time the army was scattering its contingents over thirty-one different theaters of operations, spread over all the points of the globe, it happened that there were left on the home territory of the United States nothing but skeletons of great units capable of making war.

b/ The American general staff wisely decided to preserve intact the already instructed units and to instruct the newly constituted units for better or for worse. This latter system, although being the better one, necessitated long months before an offensive army, capable of measuring up to the veterans of Germany and Japan, can really be ready.

"Information from the best sources indicates that General Marshall, at the time of his trip to London, must have indicated to the British that the United States were not prepared to send their troops first to fight, that England disposed of sufficient contingents

Secret

Thursday, May 28, 1948

- 1 -

Major-General Bonaville, the Military Attache, and Colonel Jacquin, the Air Attache, at the request of the Ambassador have jointly drawn up a note summarizing their impressions and their diagnosis of the military position of the United States at the present time.

Here is the text of the note:

"SHORTER. In giving a concerted opinion on the present military situation of the United States, it is expedient first of all to free oneself from all preconceived ideas, born out of the abundance of information given by the press and the radio. As a matter of fact, this information is largely imaginary or twisted.

"The United States have passed through three stages during the course of a year:

"1. Attempt at psychological pressure on the Axis by means of proclaiming an enormous financial program for meeting war expenses. It is apparent that this attempt did not impress either Germany or Japan;

"2. Attempt at psychological pressure on the Axis by means of proclaiming excellent results in the output of factories for war materials in the United States. These, too, the enemies of the United States

-4-

\*In regard to the air forces, there is the same situation. There are at present fifty-four combat groups, formed and instructed. Now it is announced that the air force is going to consist of 84 groups, which shows well that the existing units will still remain on American territory. In fact, it will only be when the Air Corps expansion program is obstructed by the number of existing groups already instructed, that the United States is going to be able to "export" combat squadrons. Until then it is completely occupied with extension and growth, without any serious possibility of going into competition with enemy air forces which have already proved themselves on twenty fields of battle.

\*In regard, the military situation of the United States, when stripped of the lyricism of the journalists and radio commentators and of the optimism expressed by official personages, is quite clearly unfavorable. It allows no important strategic movement, no great tactical strategy, and even less the opening of a second front in Europe or Asia."

-3-

nothing but skeletons of great units capable of making war.

\*b/ The American general staff wisely decided to preserve intact the already instructed units and to instruct the newly constituted units for better or for worse. This latter system, although being the better one, necessitated long months before an offensive army, capable of measuring up to the veterans of Germany and Japan, can really be ready.

\*Information from the best sources indicates that General Marshall, at the time of his trip to London, must have indicated to the British that the United States were not prepared to send their troops first to fight, that England disposed of sufficient contingents to open a second front, that in that case the American army would be ready to dispatch contingents for the purpose of providing relief of the territory of Great Britain, but that in no case would the American general staff agree to open the battle of the continent first.

-2-

\*1. Attempt at psychological pressure on the Axis by means of proclaiming an enormous financial program for meeting war expenses. It is apparent that this attempt did not impress either Germany or Japan.

\*2. Attempt at psychological pressure on the Axis by means of proclaiming excellent results in the start of factories for war materials in the United States. There, too, the enemies of the United States were not at all impressed and continued the cycle of their operations imperturbably.

\*3. Putting into operation the armed forces and the air forces. Here there are two periods: a/ The army tried to form new units by gradually taking from the existing units officers and non-commissioned officers to instruct the new recruits. The result was deplorable for at the same time the army was scattering its contingents over thirty-one different theaters of operations, spread over all the points of the globe, it happened that there were left on the home territory of the United States



May 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of a note prepared by Major General Bonaville and Colonel Jacquin at the request of the French Ambassador. As you will see, this note summarizes their impressions, as well as their diagnosis, of the military position of the United States at the moment.

This note came into my hands and I am sending it to you for your information.

**SECRET.** In giving a personal opinion on the present military situation of the United States, it is expedient first of all to free one's mind from preconceived ideas, born out of the abundance of information given by the press and the radio. As a matter of fact, this information is largely imaginary or twisted.

The United States have passed through three stages during the course of a year:

Brigadier General William B. Smith,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am enclosing a memorandum that I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff will want to see.

William J. Donovan



...entened at a distance and, when possible the area of anti U-boat

...of aircraft required depend upon the intensity of U-boat activity.

...effectively to carry out this work around ... would require a total first-line

...boats, as indicated above, and to give it is obvious not only that full night flying ... must possess means of detecting ... The best known present means of ... doubt that effective war on ... A.S.V. equipment capable ... visual lookout on the U-boats

...radio altimeter whereby the aircraft ... water in all conditions of light and

...sent to enable the bombs or depth ... feet or lower.

...which will either explode ... on reaching a depth of not

...provided either with a search- ... illuminating the ob- ... at 1 mile range. Experience ... to solve the night detection ... indication must be followed ... powerful illuminant that will ... into a visual observation.

...is contained in a ... Coastal Command. ... necessary, they can be ... for the information of ... in too much detail

*B. J. ...*  
*Chief, Coastal*  
*Royal Air Force*



extended

-3-

they were essential for anti-submarine warfare. The Navy had just prepared a strong paper for the Prime Minister, to be presented to him upon his return. I am attaching, memorandum given to me by Captain Creasy, the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare. I am also attaching two memoranda given to me by Sir Philip Joubert, who is the Commander in Chief of the Coastal Command. One is on the use of South Irish bases and the other is on anti-submarine warfare as practiced around the British coast by aircraft.

-2-

extreme measures against Churchill and were seeking to have Beaverbrook accept leadership in such a movement. The speech arranged for Beaverbrook to make at Birmingham was evidently part of their program. I had a distinct impression that Beaverbrook was at least listening to the proposals. Later, however, with the defeat at Tobruk (which aroused anger in the people as well as making them depressed) and the realization by Beaverbrook that no more than 30 votes could be obtained in Parliament against Churchill, his ardor evidently cooled. He came to see me the day I was leaving and said that he was going to support Churchill, but that he intended to continue to advocate a second front, and that furthermore there was a need to build up an opposition in the House of Commons.

As to the second question: I talked to Harris, who is the head of the Bomber Command, and who is putting into effect the policy of bombardment of strategic industrial targets in Germany. I found an active and a bitter controversy on as to the use of a long range bomber. The Army was demanding their use in Libya and the Navy said

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

June 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: William J. Donovan

Two questions, it seemed to me, were confronting the British at this time:

(1) Is the question of the second front to be used in England as a political issue with which tooust Churchill?

(2) How is the issue to be determined between the Air Force, on the one side, and the Army and Navy, on the other, as to the most effective use to be made of long range bombers?

As to question (1), I had an opportunity of seeing this at close hand. Beaverbrook was very anxious to discuss matters both with the Ambassador and with me. After consulting with the Ambassador, I saw Beaverbrook on three or four occasions. On one of these occasions, he had come in a group of extreme Tories led by Erskine Hill, who was Chairman of the so-called 1922 Committee of the Conservative Party. It was very evident that this Committee was for

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

June 28, 1942

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

I enclose a memorandum which I thought you might  
want to hand to the Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

-4-

- (e) Additional special aircraft for photographic reconnaissance of the enemy surface forces.
- (f) To reinforce the Russian bomber force at Murmansk.
- (g) To persuade the Russians to operate all submarines against enemy surface forces during passage of the convey - steps are being taken at this end.
- (h) To provide additional long-range fighter protection for the convey and perhaps also for the bombing force.

#### Battle of the Atlantic.

17. In discussing the Battle of the Atlantic Rear Admiral Brind expressed his personal view that the arbitrary dividing line between the British and U.S. responsibilities gravely hampers development of full efficiency, and the ideal is by some means or other, pocketing all pride, jealousies or resentments, to work together in such a way that the Atlantic is in fact all one area.

Undoubtedly a very great deal indeed has been done to this end but we are not yet fully efficient neither with regard to using our combined resources nor in pooling the results of our experience and research.

18. He remarked on the very great experience of the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, and his Chief of Staff and their very highly developed personal abilities in the field of cooperation, and he felt confident that it only needed personal contact with these officers by similar officers of the other side to be quite sure that we should develop maximum efficiency.

#### Command of the Sea.

19. The great problem before us is to regain full control of the sea both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. It seems fundamental that the highest priority, strategically, tactically and in industry, should be given to all activities which would enable us to reduce shipping losses to an acceptable figure. This can only be done by a right combination of air and surface forces working at sea. We are at present weak in carriers, short of long-range shore-based reconnaissance aircraft, sadly in need of re-equipping our carriers with modern fighters and torpedo/bombers and urgently require air striking forces trained for attacking ships at sea, and U-boats.

20. It is clear that the degree to which we divert our effort to rebuild our forces on the sea and in the air for maritime purposes comes into conflict with the need for developing strategic bombing.

16th June, 1943.



Top ↑

Mem.

J.G.W.

If it is accepted, as it should be, that shipping is the only foundation on which victory can be achieved, then it is evident that the present priority given to strategical bombing must be reviewed.

From

P.H.

Even No. roll

Exp. no. 12. 9. 1. 1.

-3-

11. When the convoy passes East of 100E. the Commander-in-Chief must keep his forces as handy as possible without undue risk from the air and submarines; if he is to operate effectively from these positions he must have good reconnaissance of the enemy surface ships. This can only be given by long-range aircraft of the Liberator type or by aircraft from Murmansk. They must be good aircraft or they will soon be destroyed by the Ju.88; the Catalina cannot do this job properly, and must be confined to reconnaissance patrols covering the convoy or to A/S work in such positions where it is not open to attack by superior aircraft.

12. Rear Admiral Brind's view was that it is almost certain that the Germans think they have taken our form and that they will now try conclusions against the convoy with surface vessels. If they succeed in reaching the convoy without serious interference from our surface, air or submarine forces, the effect would be devastating; our escorts would have to meet in broad daylight these two powerful ships escorted by six modern destroyers, they would undoubtedly give a good account of themselves but it ought to be surprising if the enemy were not able to destroy a large part of the convoy.

13. We must recall that we are now approaching the foggy season, and if Fortune is kind to us this should be a great help, but it may not be all on our side because the fog is sometimes low and we may have the very uncomfortable situation of the convoy steaming along in the fog with all its masts showing above for the benefit of aircraft.

#### 14. Fighter Protection.

Another important requirement at Murmansk is the long-range fighter, used to flying over the sea. If these can be made available, valuable additional security can be provided to the convoy for the last two or three hundred miles of its passage.

#### Extension of the Route to Archangel.

15. When Archangel is opened up the route becomes much longer and our difficulties concerning fuel for the escorts are increased; the convoy is also subjected to air and U-boat attack for a longer period and in a particularly dangerous region at the approaches to the White Sea.

16. The requirements to help the convoy may be summarised as follows:

- (a) Long-range, high-performance aircraft to escort the convoys as far as possible from the United Kingdom and to destroy the shadowing aircraft.
- (b) Provision of a carrier to go with the convoy, but it must be recognised that this will be a considerable risk to the carrier.
- (c) Long-range aircraft to provide reconnaissance and patrols against enemy surface forces from Northern Norway.
- (d) To establish a Torpedo/bombing force at Murmansk.

-2-

Iceland, but the most practical way is to base the aircraft on Russian Aerodromes near Murmansk.

7. The Russians have about 50 bombers and there is little hope of getting reinforcements for them, furthermore it is only a small proportion of these that can reach the aerodromes at Banak and Bardufoss. During the last convoy 6 bombers did reach Banak and the convoy seemed to have a free run on the following day, this may well have been due to the results of this attack.

Rear Admiral Brind's personal view was that the Russians regard the safe and timely arrival of this convoy as an affair for Great Britain and the U.S.A., that they consider themselves already fully committed in Russia and that it is up to us to see the convoy through. This opinion is strongly supported by those who have returned from North Russia, but all admit that the Russian flying men are very keen to help although they have little experience of flying over the sea and convoy work.

It would be of great benefit if we could reinforce the Russian bomber force with British or U.S. aircraft near Murmansk, but there may well be political difficulties and there certainly are difficulties concerning supplies though these should not be insurmountable.

#### The Threat from Surface Forces.

8. The other great danger to the convoy lies in the presence of the two pocket battleships North of Tromsø. It is clear that the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, must be very cautious about operating his heavy ships East of 100E, where they would be gravely endangered by U-boats and air attack, and where it would be very difficult to operate his destroyers to screen the Fleet because of the fuel problem. It is our purpose, therefore, to render the waters East of Ender Island exceedingly uncomfortable for the enemy. This could best be done as follows -

By the skilful use of submarines in conjunction with the air.

By the employment of a torpedo/bombing striking force from Murmansk,

and by a bomber force.

9. Very naturally the Russians do not like withdrawing their submarines from active operations against the enemy transports supplying his forces at Kirkenes, and they do not like British submarines operating far to the Eastward. We are doing our best to develop this submarine threat but have not satisfactorily solved the problem of cooperation with the available air forces, which is the best way to bring the submarines to bear.

10. So far we have not been able to establish a torpedo/bombing force at Murmansk, nor have we strengthened the Russian bombers with any from Great Britain; there have been no many Russian assurances that the bombing effort would be materially increased.

Copy

MOST SECRET

(Admiralty Seal)

Mr. Winant received Rear Admiral Brind 15th June and discussed the war at sea generally, and in particular the passage of the Northern convoys.

2. The following is the sense of Rear Admiral Brind's remarks -

#### Enemy Aircraft Reconnaissance.

3. The P.Q. convoys have to face Focke Wulf reconnaissance aircraft soon after leaving Icelandic waters and can be expected to be found before they reach Jan Mayen. The Focke Wulf keeps constant contact and "homes" the U-boats and air striking forces when the weather is suitable.

On the last occasion the air attacks developed soon after passing Jan Mayen and continued with varying intensity well past Bear Island on the Eastern course.

#### U-boat Threat.

4. The U-boats also made contact early but their activities were severely restricted by the vigorous action of the escorts, and they were handicapped by continuous daylight. It is to be hoped that if we can maintain the same strength of escorts and if the enemy do not very largely increase their U-boat strength in the North we should prevent the losses from U-boat attack being unduly serious. Such a result would, however, be made much more certain if we could only maintain constant air patrol over the convoy to keep the U-boat down and restrict his mobility. Such air patrol could only be maintained if we had greater resources of long-range aircraft or if we could keep a carrier with the convoy.

#### The Threat from Air Attacks.

5. The most important step towards increasing the security of the convoy is to provide a means of destroying the attacking aircraft, which would result in reducing the threat from both the air and U-boats. No carriers are at present available; the only two AVENGER Class so far received are suffering from machinery defects, there is only one carrier with the Home Fleet and the others are sorely needed at their present stations.

It must be recalled that the only carrier-borne fighters available in Home Waters are the Fulmars, which are too slow to destroy the Focke Wulf. The great need is now for Hurricane fighters. They are also very urgently required in the carriers in the East, and there is little hope of the Home Fleet carrier being so equipped; this very seriously hampers the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. A supply of these aircraft is arranged from the United States, but it does not meet all needs.

Another means by which additional security can be provided is to develop a vigorous bombing offensive against U-boat bases. This might be done as a special enterprise by long-range aircraft from the British Isles or

Top ↑

This is from a leg Adm Brind,   
 Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Home).   
 His command includes Home Fleet and   
 Arctic Command. He has recently been   
 Chief of Staff for Adm Torrey C. in C   
Home Fleet.

ppp

[Even No. calls]

[Exposure in 1/25 (A. 1.6.5)]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: William J. Donovan

Here is a memorandum handed to me following the interview between Mr. Winant and Rear Admiral Brind, who is Assistant Chief of Naval Staff and whose command consists of the Fleet and Arctic Convoys.



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 6, 1941

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

If you think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would  
find the attached of interest, would you pass it on?

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

*File  
"JCS Reports Sent"*

*Monthly Report 1416  
X OSS*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. X JCS

December 2, 1942

To: ✓ Colonel Donovan  
Colonel Buxton  
All Branch Heads

From: Secretariat

Subject: Monthly Report of OSS for November, 1942

Captain Doering has spoken with Lt. Colonel Onthank of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff in connection with the form which the OSS Monthly Report to J.C.S. for November, 1942 will take. Colonel Onthank indicated that although he has been unable to present the matter to the Chiefs of Staff for their formal consideration, it is, nevertheless, his opinion that the form used for the October, 1942 report will be satisfactory for the month of November.

Accordingly it is requested that all branches of OSS prepare the report of their activities for November, 1942 on the form used the preceding month. A sample of the paper to be used is attached hereto as is a copy of the pertinent section of last month's report.

Each branch is requested to submit to the Secretariat its report for November, 1942 not later than December 10. At the time of submitting such report, it is urged that the attached copy of last month's report be returned.

*EAP*

Attachments